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California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean, 883 F.3d 1173 
(9th Cir. 2018) 
 
Thomas Mooney-Myers  
 
In California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to end an experimental sea 
otter colony and translocation program. Commercial fishing groups sought 
reversal of the decision due to their interest in maintaining the 
translocation program which reduced otter predation on commercially 
valuable shellfish. While the Ninth Circuit held the group had standing, it 
then applied the Chevron test and determined the agency’s actions were 
reasonable.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean arose out of the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) decision to end an 
experimental otter population program in 2013.1 The California 
Association of Commercial Urchin Fishermen (“Association”) was 
concerned that the cessation of the otter relocation program would directly 
lead to a decrease in shellfish harvest in the previously otter-free 
management zone due to a likely increase in the local otter population.2 In 
its complaint, the Association alleged that the Service lacked the delegated 
authority to end the program.3 
The Association sought to force the Service to reinstate the 
terminated program.4 On remand, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California held that while the Association had standing, 
the Service had, under the Chevron test, acted reasonably and had the right 
to terminate the program.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the holdings of the 
lower court.6 
  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The California sea otter was hunted for its valuable fur during the 
1700s and 1800s and was nearly driven to extinction.7 It was listed as an 
endangered species in 1977 under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 
and in 1982 the Service developed a recovery plan.8 To assist in otter 
                                                          
1. California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean, 883 F.3d 1174, 1177 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id. at 1179. 
3. Id.  
4. Id.  
5. Id. at 1174. 
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
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recovery, the Service planned to create a new colony away from the parent 
population that would preserve a stable otter population even if an oil spill 
or similar event endangered the parent population.9 In 1986, Congress 
passed Public Law 99-625, which authorized the Service to implement its 
otter relocation and management plan.10 In 1987, the Service approved its 
final rule for the experimental population program which included five 
“failure conditions,” each serving as a basis for ending the program.11 The 
rule outlined the experimental population’s goals and range.12 It further 
established an otter-free management zone around the experimental 
population that separated the newly-colonized otters from the parent 
population.13 Under the 1987 rule, sea otters found in the management 
zone would be captured by non-lethal means and released in either the 
experimental population or parent population, to prevent the two 
populations from merging.14 As a protected species, fishermen who 
“incidentally harmed” sea otters were liable under the ESA and the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”).15 However, this incidental take 
liability was relaxed within the management zone.16 
In 2012, the Service determined that one of the failure conditions 
of the 1987 rule had been met and decided to end the program, including 
the otter-free management zone and the exemption from incidental take 
liability.17 The Association’s initial challenge was dismissed as untimely 
based upon the 1987 implementation of the rule, but upon remand the 
lower court determined the statute of limitations had actually begun 
running at the time the decision to terminate the program was made, in 
2012.18 
This case arrived before the Ninth Circuit on an appeal of a grant 
of summary judgment for the Service by the lower court.19 In the 
Association’s initial complaint it challenged the Service’s decision to end 
the relocation program, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the 
grounds that the Service lacked authority to terminate the program.20  The 
Ninth Circuit eventually reversed and remanded the district court’s grant 
of a motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds.21 Upon remand, the district 
court granted summary judgment for the Service, finding the Association 
                                                          
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 1178. 
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
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had standing, but the Service had acted within its statutory authority to end 
the program.22 The Association subsequently appealed.23 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the Association had the 
necessary standing, if the Service was reasonable in its decision to 
terminate the program under the Chevron test, and the validity of the 
Association’s arguments under the non-delegation doctrine and an MMPA 
amendment.24 
 
A. Standing 
 
In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) it 
has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and (b) actual or 
imminent; (2) related to the challenged action; and (3) the harm will likely 
be reduced by a favorable decision.25 The Association presented two 
theories to establish standing: (1) the return of incidental take liability in 
the management zone increased liability for fishermen; and (2) the 
increase in otters in the management zone would increase otter 
consumption of commercially valuable shellfish, reducing the available 
catch for commercial fishermen.26 
 
1. Increased Risk of Liability 
 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association’s first argument 
because a potential risk of prosecution did not rise to the level of “concrete 
and particularized harm.”27  The Ninth Circuit explained that a “genuine 
threat of imminent prosecution” must exist for an increased risk of 
prosecution to provide standing.28 
To assess whether the threat of prosecution would be considered 
“genuine,” the Ninth Circuit considered three factors: (1) whether the 
Association had a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether 
the authority capable of prosecuting the law had communicated a threat or 
warning of impending proceedings; and (3) whether or not there was a 
history of past prosecution of enforcement of the relevant statute.29 Even 
though the Association offered declarations from members of the fishing 
industry, the Ninth Circuit held that these declarations did not demonstrate 
                                                          
22. Id.  
               23. Id.  
24. Id. at 1177, 1184-1185. 
25. Id. at 1180. 
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. Id. (quoting Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 
764, 773 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
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a genuine threat of prosecution.30 The Service had not issued any warnings 
or threats, and there was no history of prosecution for incidental takes of 
southern sea otters.31 
The Association also argued that it had standing due to a threat of 
prosecution because they were the objects of regulation,32 citing LA Haven 
Hospice Inc. v. Sebelius33 and Abbot Labs v. Gardner.34 The Ninth Circuit 
held the Association sought too broad an application of those cited cases.35 
The Ninth Circuit further found that the changes in regulations for the 
management zone did not require any change in the fishing practices of 
the Association, thereby not conveying standing.36 
 
2. Increased Otter Predation of Commercially Valuable Shellfish 
 
The Association also provided testimony on the significant impact 
sea otters had on shellfish populations throughout the management zone.37 
The Ninth Circuit held this to be a concrete and particularized harm 
providing the Association with standing to pursue its claims.38 The Service 
argued this did not convey standing because it could not fully exclude sea 
otters, but the Ninth Circuit held that in order to demonstrate standing the 
Association did not need to “show that the requested relief will inevitably 
alleviate the harm complained of.”39 Ultimately, it was held that the 
Association’s second theory was sufficient to convey standing.40 
 
B.  Chevron Test 
 
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the deferential two-step Chevron 
test to determine if the Service’s interpretation of Public Law 9-625 was 
reasonable.41 Step one of the Chevron test assesses whether Congress has 
spoken directly to its interpretation of the issue at hand.42 If Congress has 
not spoken to the issue directly, step two addresses whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.43  Step two of the Chevron test is usually 
extremely deferential to the interpretation of the agency in question.44 
                                                          
30. Id. at 1181. 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33.  638 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir. 2011). 
34. 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967). 
35. Id. at 1181. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 1182. 
41. Id.  
42. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
867, 842-44 (1984)). 
43. Id. at 1180. 
                44. Id. 
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In the court’s analysis under step one, the Association argued the 
statutory language of Public Law 99-625 was clear and unambiguous, 
citing language that the translocation plan “shall include” a management 
zone, and the Secretary “shall implement” the plan.45 The Association 
argued this mandatory language required the Service to maintain the 
program until Congress expressly decides otherwise.46 The Service 
responded that the statute gave it discretion to develop and implement a 
plan and must give it corresponding discretion to terminate that plan.47 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association’s arguments because 
the statute did not expressly forbid or allow the Service to terminate the 
program.48  Application of step two of the Chevron test held that in light 
of the goals of the ESA, it was reasonable for the Service to interpret the 
statute as conveying the authority to terminate the program.49 The Ninth 
Circuit also reasoned that the experimental nature of the program made it 
reasonable to expect that the program would not run indefinitely.50 The 
court further reasoned that under the Association’s interpretation, the 
Service would be required to continue the program even if no otters 
remained in the experimental population area.51 The Ninth Circuit then 
affirmed the district court’s holding, finding no reason to consider the 
Service’s actions unreasonable.52 
 
C.   Non-Delegation Doctrine 
 
The Association also presented a constitutional challenge to the 
Service’s decision to terminate the experimental population program, 
citing the non-delegation doctrine.53 The non-delegation doctrine is 
founded upon the principle that Congress cannot delegate its legislative 
authority to agencies and must provide an “intelligible principal” upon 
which to base their regulations.54 The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
Association’s non-delegation argument because the intelligible principle 
within a statute “can still be somewhat vague without offending the 
Constitution[,]” and further held the statute provided substantial guidance 
to the Service, and “there [was] no serious constitutional question to 
avoid[.]”55 
 
 
 
                                                          
45. Id. at 1182, 1183. 
46. Id. at 1183. 
47. Id.  
48. Id.  
49. Id.  
50. Id.  
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 1184. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 1185. 
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D.   Marine Mammal Protection Act 
 
The Association also argued that a 1994 amendment to the MMPA 
supported its argument of an unreasonable interpretation by the Service of 
Public Law 99-625.56 The MMPA amendment relaxed restrictions on 
incidental takes, but the rescission of the 1987 rule would make sea otters 
subject to the baseline MMPA rules.57 The Association asserted those 
MMPA rules were less lenient regarding incidental takes.58  The 
Association argued this would not be allowed under the statutory scheme, 
because it would conflict with Public Law 99-625.59  The Ninth Circuit 
found this argument unconvincing, quoting language in the amendment 
stating it “shall not be deemed to amend or repeal” Public Law 99-625.60 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The holdings of this case demonstrate a strong and continued 
practice of deferential treatment toward agencies by ways of the Chevron 
test. The holding of this case regarding timeliness better allow plaintiffs to 
challenge implementation of older rules. However, a lesser bar to 
timeliness still does not overcome the continued low bar agencies must 
meet to comply with step two of the Chevron test.   
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